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Abstract
We investigate whether and, if so, when and where a new European integration
dimension emerges in national party competition that complements the traditional
left/right-dimension in Europe. We develop a Bayesian Finite Mixture Factor Anal-
ysis to estimate the probability for the latent one-dimensional traditional left/right
and two-dimensional inverted U-shaped configuration with anti-European parties
at the peripheries. Our empirical analysis combines expert and transformed mani-
festo data, covering the period since World War II. The estimation reveals that the
probability for a one-dimensional configuration becomes on average less likely than
the probability for a two-dimensional configuration since the late 1980s. We provide
evidence that the increasing transfer of competences to the EU as manifested by EU
membership plays a key role for the emergence of the European integration dimen-
sion. Our findings are supported by a series of validity tests and have implications
for a many political phenomena.
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Introduction
On January 25th, 2015, the left-wing party Syriza won the Greek elections and one day
later formed a government with the small right-wing party Independent Greeks. From
the traditional left versus right-perspective, this is a surprising coalition because both
parties pursue very different goals in economic, social and environmental affairs. However,
they are aligned in their scepticism against the “troika” of institutions (the European
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund) and their
strategy to overcome the Eurozone crisis. The former ruling parties, the New Democracy
and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, lost about half of their former parliamentary
seats to Syriza. A similar rise of left- and right-wing Eurosceptic parties is emerging in
other European Union (EU) member countries, i.e. in France with the Front National,
the United Kingdom Independence Party in Britain, the Liberal Party in Austria, the
Alternative fu¨r Deutschland in Germany, the Five Star movement in Italy and Podemos
(“We Can”) in Spain. This development is raising the question, whether a new European
integration dimension is characterizing Europe’s national party competition by cross-
cutting the traditional left/right-dimension, which is for some scholars “the one dimension
that arguably allows for meaningful cross-national comparisons” (Adams, 2012, p. 402).
Because the emergence of a new dimension in national party competition is a long term
process changing the historical cleavage structure (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), a further
question is when and where this dimension emerges in European countries. Early on, Hix
and Lord (1997, p. 27) suggested that the emerging conflict “about more or less European
integration derived from deep social, cultural, national and territorial traditions” cross-
cuts the traditional left/right- dimension of party competition in Europe, which leads
to an inverted U-shaped party configuration: Peripheral parties at the left and right of
the ideological spectrum oppose European integration yet centrist parties are supporting
it (Taggart, 1998; Marks, Wilson and Ray, 2002; Hooghe et al., 2010). Although the
dimensionality of a national policy space “is a central determinant of political competition
and outcomes” (Gabel and Hix, 2002, p. 934), and although this conflict is likely to
become more and more salient with the transfer of monetary and currency competences
to the European level, we have little evidence about when and in which countries such
an inverted U-shaped party configuration is emerging in Europe. In fact, a cross-cutting
European integration dimension may explain several phenomena that seem puzzling from
the traditional left/right one-dimensional perspective, such as the formation of coalitions
between peripheral left- and right-wing parties or between large center parties to “grand”
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coalitions.
To answer these questions, we examine whether an inverted U-shaped configuration of
political parties characterizes party competition at national elections better than a tradi-
tional left/right-dimension. Our approach involves the construction of a novel statistical
model and the combination of two distinct data sources. Building on the literature of
mixture modeling (Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter, 2006; Imai and Tingley, 2012), we introduce a
mixture of latent variable models that allows us to estimate latent party positions and their
dimensionality from the data. Because of our longitudinal perspective on the emergence
of a new dimension, we apply this model to the dataset of the Comparative Manifesto
Project (CMP), which contains data on the programmatic statements of 388 parties for all
elections since World War II (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann and Volkens, 2007). Follow-
ing Lowe et al. (2011), we construct from these data 16 issue scales by transforming the 56
CMP saliency categories Ko¨nig and Luig (2012). We use also expert survey knowledge on
the configuration of party families from the Chapel Hill dataset (Steenbergen and Marks,
2007; Hooghe et al., 2010; Bakker, Jolly and Polk, 2012) to define the latent policy space
a priori. Using information on the configuration of party families allows us to “leverage
our de facto knowledge of these dimensions as part of the estimation process” (Benoit
and Laver, 2012, p. 216).
Our findings on national party competitiion show that the probability for the one-dimensional
left/right space becomes less likely than the two-dimensional inverted U-shaped space
since the late 1980s when the Single European Act set up the common market project
in the EU. The examination of the country-specific trends reveals that most Western
European countries experience a trend towards a two-dimensional space since the 1970s
or 1980s. A notable exception are France, Great Britain and Ireland, where the polit-
ical space becomes two-dimensional before the 1970s. In spite of their high number of
parties, Denmark and Finland remain one-dimensional. Furthermore, party competition
in many new member states from Eastern Europe indicates a similar trend towards two-
dimensionality since the 1990s. However, as the period of analysis is much shorter due to
those countries’ later transitions to democracy at the end of the 1980s and their recent
accession to the EU in the early 2000s, a more cautious interpretation of this result is war-
ranted. On closer inspection of our analysis, we find that the dimensionality parameter
corresponds to historical junctures of important political events, such as EU membership.
This suggests that the emergence of the second dimension is related to the increasing
competences of the EU. Furthermore, the factor loadings of the new dimension reveal
that its substantive nature is related to a conflict over strengthening of EU institutions
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and enlargement as well as a conflict over immigration and cultural diversity. Finally, we
find that our estimated party positions correlate with other measures of party positions
from expert and public opinion polls.
Our result on the emergence of the new European integration dimension in almost all EU
member countries challenges our understanding of the implications of European integra-
tion for national party competition and may have important ramifications for scholars
using party positions (e.g. Tsebelis, 1999; Mair, 2000; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002;
Marks and Steenbergen, 2002; Meguid, 2005; Martin and Vanberg, 2005; Adams and Mer-
rill, 2006; Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu, 2011; Adams, 2012; Franchino and Høyland,
2009; Tavits and Letki, 2009; Laver, 2014). The Greek example from the first paragraph
demonstrates that this new dimension may decrease the decisive effect of left-right ide-
ology in national party competitition and outcomes, such as the formation of a coalition
and policy outcomes. Our analysis provides evidence on when and in which countries the
conflict over European integration emerges, which underscores the reasons for the grow-
ing importance of Eurosceptic parties in most national party systems (De Vries, 2007;
Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008; Topaloff, 2012). Our insights may also stimulate the de-
bate about the reasons, stability and implications of this new dimension for national party
competition (e.g. Benoit and Laver, 2012; Bakker, Jolly and Polk, 2012). Apart from this,
our approach is applicable to other data sources and phenomena, such as the study of the
dimensionality in the U.S. Congress, United Nations General Assembly and the European
Parliament (e.g. Poole, Rosenthal and Koford, 1991; Voeten, 2000; Clinton, Jackman and
Rivers, 2004; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2006).
European Integration and
National Party Competition
One of the most fundamental explanation for the configuration of national party compe-
tition in European party systems goes back to the seminal study of Lipset and Rokkan
(1967) on cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments. From a historical
perspective, Lipset and Rokkan argue that the major dimensions of national party com-
petition are “frozen” because they result from enduring, long-lasting cleavages in the
social fabric. These cleavages are a function of historical junctures and which provide the
foundation for the creation of national party systems at the beginning of the twentieth
century. The most important condition for a cleavage to become salient is that political
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parties compete around the cleavage (McAllister and White, 2007, p. 198). For Lipset
and Rokkan, the freezing of the party systems in Europe took place in the 1920s - a thesis,
which has attracted much scholarly attention (e.g. Lijphart, 1979; Roberts and Wibbels,
1999; Pierson, 2000; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003). An empirical implication is
that many scholars reduce this classic cleavage structure to a left/right dimension (e.g.
Meguid, 2005; Tavits, 2007; Franchino and Høyland, 2009; Tavits and Letki, 2009; Adams,
Ezrow and Somer-Topcu, 2011; Adams, 2012).
With the continuous transfer of policy-making competences from the national to the EU
level, scholars debate whether and how EU membership is influencing national politics and
altering the configuration of national party competition in ther member states of the EU.
Substantively, this transfer is raising a conflict “about more or less European integration
derived from deep social, cultural, national and territorial traditions” (Hix and Lord,
1997, p. 27). Conceptually, some colleagues argue that the left/right-dimension absorbs
the issues of European integration (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000), while others emphasize
that European integration stimulates the formation of a new, cross-cutting dimension
(Hix and Lord, 1997; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Kriesi, 2007). Until now, empirical studies
provide a mixed picture on the existence of this new dimension: Proksch and colleagues
using public opinion and expert surveys as well as roll call votes of members of the
European Parliament argue that the European integration scale is dichotomous (Proksch
and Lo, 2012; Lo, Proksch and Gschwend, 2014). Despite the growing saliency of European
integration issues in electoral manifestos (Pennings, 2006; Spoon, 2012), several studies
report no evidence for a major change in the dimensionality of the policy space that is
related to European integration (Warwick, 2002; Albright, 2010; Stoll, 2010).
Evidence for the existence of a new European integration dimension mostly comes from
recent expert surveys, according to which center parties are more pro-European, while
extreme parties from the left- and right-wing pursue a more Eurosceptic position. This
produces an inverted U-shape configuration of political parties that cannot be reduced
to a one dimensional left/right space (Marks, Wilson and Ray, 2002; Hooghe, Marks and
Wilson, 2002; Benoit and Laver, 2006; Bakker, Jolly and Polk, 2012). Also Kriesi (2007, p.
99) corroborates this result using coded media reports1. Currently, the growing literature
on Eurosceptism also points to the increasing importance and cross-cutting character
1Apart from national party competition, several studies report that the traditional left/right-
dimension is complemented by a European integration dimension in the policy spaces of the Council,
the European Parliament and at European parliamentary elections (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2006; Hix,
1999; Mattila, 2004). Note that several studies come to a different conclusion (Gabel and Hix, 2002;
Thomson, Boerefijn and Stokman, 2004; Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins, 2005).
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of European integration. Accordingly, peripheral parties from the left- and right-wing
spectrum increased their popularity by opposing European integration since the coming
into force of the Maastricht Treaty (1993) which transferred monetary and currency com-
petences to the EU level. While much of this literature draws the attention to voters’
reasons to support left- and right-wing Eurosceptic parties (e.g. De Vries and Edwards,
2009; Visser et al., 2014; March and Rommerskirchen, 2015), the findings also highlight
the common Eurosceptism of left- and right-wing peripheral parties and their strategic
considerations to pursue Eurosceptic positions (Marks and Wilson, 2000; Taggart, 1998;
Sitter, 2001; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008; Topaloff, 2012).
In our view, one reason for the mixed picture of empirical studies on the existence of a
European integration dimension is that the studies use different data sources to identify a
new dimension that eventually complements the left/right-dimension. Until now, studies
using party manifestos hardly find a second European integration dimension, while more
recent expert surveys reveal an inverted U-shaped configuration. Compared to manifestos
which provide new estimates about every four years at each election, it remains difficult
to specify the time frame of experts’ assessments (McDonald, Mendes and Kim, 2007;
Bakker, Jolly and Polk, 2012). Instead of preferring the one against the other, we propose
to combine the two data sources and use expert data as a prior to estimate the proba-
bility for this European integration dimension with an inverted U-shaped configuration
of political parties in national party competition on the basis of party manifestos 2. Be-
cause existing studies on party manifestos hardly found a second European integration
dimension, our analysis is a conservative test of when and where it is more likely that this
specific dimension complements the traditional left/right-dimension in each country.
Bayesian Mixture Factor Analysis
Our statistical analysis belongs to the class of latent variable models because both the
policy space and the positions of political parties are latent, which means that we can
neither directly observe the nature of the dimensions nor the location of the political
parties. Instead, latent dimensions, as well as parties’ positions, need to be estimated
2Other authors propose separating an economic from a social or cultural left/right-dimension related
to post-materialist conflict (Inglehart, 1971), new politics issues (Franklin, Mackie and Valen, 1992) and
authoritarian-libertarian conflict (Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2006). However, because there is a strong
linear relationship between parties’ positions on the economic and social or cultural left/right dimensions
(Marks et al., 2006, p. 158), it is questionable whether this produces a second dimension of national
party competition (see also Kitschelt, 1994, p. 27).
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by using a statistical model. Compared to existing latent variable models that estimate
party policy positions from party manifestos (e.g. Gabel and Huber, 2000; Bakker, 2009;
Ko¨nig, Marbach and Osnabru¨gge, 2013), we do not assume a fixed dimensionality of the
policy space. Instead, we estimate the election-specific probability that a second inverted
U-shaped latent dimension characterizes the configuration of national parties beyond the
left/right-dimension.
Data
For our study of the election-specific dimensionality we use two prominent datasets, expert
survey data from the Chapel Hill dataset (Steenbergen and Marks, 2007; Hooghe et al.,
2010) and coded manifesto data from the CMP project (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann
and Volkens, 2007). Although our approach is also applicable to other phenomena and
less critically evaluated data sources (e.g. Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov, 2009; Mikhaylov,
Laver and Benoit, 2012), we decided to use CMP data because this dataset covers national
party competition in European countries since World War II. In our view, this long-
term perspective is necessary for at least two reasons: According to Lipset and Rokkan
(1967) we expect that the emergence of a new dimension in national party competition
is a historical process with critical junctures. Furthermore, the 25 investigated countries
joined the EU at different points of time, which means that the countries may have
experienced such junctures at different times. A further advantage is that the CMP data
include an item on the EU that allows us to probe whether our findings relate to European
integration or any other (global) development that may give rise to a second dimension.
To use CMP data in a spatial context, we follow the recommendation of Lowe et al.
(2011) and construct from the coded manifesto data (logit) issue scales with issue-specific
positions of political parties. This transformation is necessary because the data generation
of the CMP project is based on saliency theory, which counts the frequent usage of the
coded 56 categories (Laver and Garry, 2000). More specifically, we construct 16 issue
scales by assigning 36 of the 56 CMP categories to opposing poles on each scale3.
3Each issue-specific position is constructed by subtracting the logarithms of each pole’s quasi sentence
count. As suggested by Lowe et al. (2011), we also add 0.5 to each pole, which “makes position estimates
created from very small counts more stable, while barely affecting those derived from more reasonable
numbers of sentences” (Lowe et al., 2011, p. 132). The supporting material provides a list, which CMP
categories we use to construct these issue scales. It also provides an overview of the number of parties,
elections and coverage for each country as well as the distribution of each issue scale per party family.
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Model
Our statistical modeling of the latent variables builds on Bayesian factor analysis models,
in which the latent factors are the unobserved party positions on ideological dimensions
(see e.g. Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004; Quinn, 2004; Jackman, 2009). We define, yj
to be the j (j = 1, ..., J) row of our data matrix with L (l = 1, ..., L) columns. Each cell
contains the position of a party on an issue scale at a particular national election.
A general assumption of latent variable models is that each issue position is a weighted
sum of latent party positions plus measurement error. The weights are the factor loadings
and indicate the extent to which a particular latent party position is determined by each
issue scale. Similar to previous factor analytic models for CMP data, we assume that the
factor loadings are constant across countries and over time, and that the latent policy
space is orthogonal (Gabel and Huber, 2000; Bakker, 2009).
Formally, let χj be the unobserved D-dimensional position of party in an election (the
factor) and let λ be the L×D matrix of factor loadings. We can then write the mixture
of factor analysis models as follows:
yj =
{
λ1χj,1 + e1 if kj = 0
λ1χj,1 + λ2χj,2 + e2 if kj = 1
e1 ∼ N(0,Σ1)
e2 ∼ N(0,Σ2),
where kj is a binary indicator variable that indicates if a party has a one- or two di-
mensional position. Note that if we could directly observe this variable, we would have
two ordinary factor analysis models - the first being one-dimensional, the second two-
dimensional. However, since we do not know the dimensionality of an election-specific
policy space, we also have to estimate this parameter from the data. Integrating the
unobserved kj for each election e, (e = 1, ..., E) from the joint density and assuming mea-
surement error independent across issue scales, the likelihood function with the standard
normal density Φ and variance w2l can be written as:
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L =
J∏[[ L∏
Φ
(
yl,j − (λl,1χ1,j)
wl,1
)]
(1− pie[j])+[ L∏
Φ
(
yl,j − (λl,1χ1,j + λl,2χ2,j)
wl,2
)]
pie[j]
]
,
where pie[j] = Pr(ke[j] = 1). We adopt the Gelman-Hill notation (Gelman and Hill, 2007)
and let j select the corresponding index e to relate the jth observation to a corresponding
pi. Our primary interest is in pie indicating the probability for a particular dimensionality
of the policy space in the election e. To simplify the presentation of the results, we refer
to pie as the dimensionality parameter.
Our modeling has an important advantage for studying the emergence of a European
integration dimension over alternative approaches such as comparing model fit measures
(e.g. Warwick, 2002; Albright, 2010; Stoll, 2010; Bakker, Jolly and Polk, 2012). When
one estimates two separate models (one model A with D dimensions, the other model
B with D + 1 dimensions) and then compares their fit, it remains unclear whether and
to what extent the meaning of the first dimension in model A is the same as the first
dimension in model B. Our mixture model approach in turn constrains parties’ positions
and factor loadings on the first (left-right) dimension to be the same across the two
mixture components4.
Priors
Adopting a Bayesian perspective, we systematically incorporate expert survey information
about the shape of the latent policy space as priors into the estimation. Two reasons
motivate our approach. Technically, using informed priors on the party family positions
4Admittedly, this advantage of our model in estimating the dimensionality comes at the price of
complicating party position identification, for which we need a decision criteria pie, namely that the
parties in an election belong in a two dimensional space (instead of a one dimensional space). The
choice of this criteria is important because the latent party position is a function of the assigned prior
and the data. Before the estimation, we assign a prior for each party in each dimension. This prior is
then updated using the data. If the probability for a second dimension is very small, the information
available in the data about the second component’s parameters is very limited. In fact, if the probability
is essentially zero, then there is almost no information available in the data to update parties’ positions.
In this case, the posterior density of these parties is almost identical to the prior density. Although this
problem applies to all mixture models, this is not a primary concern for our study because we are mainly
interested in estimating the dimensionality of the policy space.
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identifies the model by exploiting the functional equivalence of informed prior densities
and parameter restrictions to locate the party positions on a specific scale (Jackman,
2009, p.441)5.
Substantively, we use the priors to induce a specific configuration of political parties
that is consistent with the literature’s current description of national party competition.
Empirically, we construct a priori where party families are ordered along an inverted
U-shape: The left/right extreme parties are generally opposed to further European inte-
gration whereas the left/right center parties favor it. This approach also helps to avoid
an ad hoc, ex post facto interpretation of the policy space (Benoit and Laver, 2012).
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Figure 1: Party positions from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and contours from a two-
dimensional kernel density estimation for each party family.
For each latent party position (χj) we employ a multivariate normal prior. We set each
party’s prior mean and variance to the mean and variance of its party family. We calculate
these means and variances for seven party families’ positions separately on the left/right
and the European integration dimensions from CHES expert survey data by Steenbergen
5In the supporting information we discuss in detail what the identification requirements are.
10
and Marks (2007) as well as Hooghe et al. (2010)6. Figure 1 illustrates the party posi-
tions of the Chapel Hill expert survey data and the superimposed prior density by party
families. The relation between party positions on the left/right and European integration
dimensions has an inverted U-shape. In other words, the more extreme a party’s position
on the left/right dimension, the more critical it is towards European integration. The
data also suggest that Green and Conservative parties are more critical towards Europe
than Socialist, Liberal and Christian-democratic parties. We center all parties’ priors that
are not part of a party family at 0 and assign a variance of 11, which effectively provides
no a priori information about the location of the party in the latent policy space.
For all remaining parameters where we have little a priori information, we use vague
priors. In particular, regarding the factor loadings (λl), we employ zero-centered mul-
tivariate normal priors with a diagonal covariance matrix with all elements set to 10,
and for the variance components (w.,.)) we use gamma priors (a0 = 0.001, b0 = 0.001).
For the dimensionality parameter set ((1 − pie, pie), we use uniformly shaped beta prior
(d = (1, 1)). This prior embodies our a-priori belief that a one- and a two-dimensional
space are equally likely.
Results
We implement the finite mixtures of factor analysis models in JAGS (Plummer, 2003) to
obtain samples from the marginal posterior distributions of the parameters7. We obtain
samples from three sets of parameters: the dimensionality parameters (pi), factor loadings
(λ) and latent positions of the parties (χ)8. In the supporting information we describe
6We consider the following party families: Left, Greens, Social Democrats, Liberals, Christian
Democrats, Conservatives and Nationalists using three survey waves: 1999, 2002, 2006. To merge the
manifesto data with the expert survey data, we use the party table of the ParlGov dataset provided by
Do¨ring and Manow (2012).
7The joint posterior density of our finite mixtures of factor analysis models is proportional to the
likelihood function times the prior density. As in many Bayesian models, the posterior density cannot
be marginalized analytically, which prompted us to simulate from the posterior density and then use the
simulated samples to characterize the marginal posterior densities of the parameters.
8We run two MCMC chains in parallel using multiple streams of pseudo-random numbers from the
JAGS L’Ecuyer RNG. We discard the first 10,000 iterations as burn in and draw another 20,000 values.
For data storage reasons we only save every 10th draw, yielding a posterior sample of 1,000 draws per
chain. The Gelman and Rubin (1992) convergence diagnostic supports our choice of run length. In initial
Monte Carlo Experiments, we observe that sometimes subsets of chains converge to two distinct posterior
distributions (in a sense that posterior means of the parameters were very different, but convergence was
indicated for the subset of chains by diagnostics). Further explorations of this result reveal that one of
these posteriors always has a higher deviance (deviance is generally defined as the negative of twice the
11
the Monte Carlo Experiments we conduct to verify that the model performs as expected.
We are primarily interested in the estimated election-specific dimensionality parameter,
which captures the probability that the policy space of a specific national election is
solely characterized by a single left-right dimension rather than an inverted U-shaped
two-dimensional space. We first inspect the average trend in dimensionality across all
countries before we discuss the country-specific trends and robustness. Note, that we
use a prior-consistent and impartial cutoff criteria to distinguish between one and two-
dimensional spaces9.
General Trend
Figure 2 plots the posterior mean of each dimensionality parameter for the entire study
period. Each dot shows the dimensionality parameter for each (democratic) election
that took place since World War II in the 25 countries. Note that almost half of our
country sample transformed to parliamentary democracies after the break-down of the
Soviet Union in the end of the 1980s. The distribution of the dots indicates a negative
trend over time. This means that the probability of a one-dimensional left/right space
in national party competition generally decreases over time in the 25 EU countries. To
further inspect this trend, we fitted a local polynomial regression to each set of 2000
posterior draws. The solid black line indicates the mean of the fitted curves from these
regressions, the gray lines show the 2.5%- and 97.5% quantiles. The results support our
finding that the probability for a representation of national party competition on a single
left/right-dimension is decreasing steadily in Europe. This probability decreases from
66% after World War II to approximately 32% in 2010. In sum, on average, the policy
spaces of national party competition in Europe are more likely to have a one-dimensional,
left/right configuration before the late 1980s and are increasingly likely to have a two-
dimensional, inverted U-shape thereafter. This is consistent with the literature’s general
finding that, with the continuing transfer of policy competences - especially by the Single
European Act in 1987 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the opposition to European
logarithm of the likelihood). Since higher deviance implies that the probability of the data given the
parameters is smaller, we monitor deviances for all our models in order to identify such situations and
select the subset of chains that converge to the posterior with the higher probability of the data given
the parameters.
9Throughout the presentation of the results, and to increase readability, we omit the more precise
characterization of the policy space, namely that of a one-dimensional left-right policy space or a two-
dimensional policy space with a second cross-cutting European integration dimension and a party position
configuration similar to an inverted U-shape.
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integration has been continuously increasing (Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Topaloff, 2012;
Kriesi et al., 2012; Hutter and Grande, 2014).
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Figure 2: Posterior probability for a one-dimensional left/right policy space (D = 1). We
fitted local polynomial regression on each posterior draw. The solid black line indicates the
average fitted curve. The gray lines indicate the corresponding 95% Bayesian credible interval.
Country Trends
While we find a general trend in Europe towards an inverted U-shaped two-dimensional
policy space over time, the more specific question is which countries experience this trend
at what point in time. Because almost half of our country sample transformed to par-
liamentary democracies in the end of the 1980s, it could well be that their inclusion is
responsible for this trend. Complementary to figure 2, figures 3 and 4 show the proba-
bility of a one-dimensional left/right policy space for each national election by country.
To provide a historical perspective, we order the countries along their accession date to
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Figure 3: Posterior probability for a one-dimensional left/right policy space (D = 1) for spe-
cific countries. We fitted local polynomial regression on each posterior draw. The solid black
line indicates the average fitted curve. The gray lines indicate the 2.5%- and 97.5% quantiles.
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Figure 4: Posterior probability for a one-dimensional left/right policy space (D = 1) for spe-
cific countries. We fitted local polynomial regression on each posterior draw. The solid black
line indicates the average fitted curve. The gray lines indicate the 2.5%- and 97.5% quantiles.
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the EU and super-impose a dashed 0.5-line. The six founding members Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are displayed in the first two rows, fol-
lowed by Denmark, Great Britain and Ireland which joined the EU in the 1970s. Greece,
Portugal and Spain acceded in the 1980s, and Austria, Finland and Sweden in mi d-
1990s. After the turn of the century, 10 Eastern European countries joined the EU, all of
which became parliamentary democracies after the break-down of the Soviet Union. To
interpret the country-specific trends, we use the average fitted curve of a local polyno-
mial regression. The graphs reveal that five out of the six founding members (Belgium,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) exhibit a strong monotone, negative
trend since the 1970s. On closer inspection of these founding members, only France is
two-dimensional since the late 1950s, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg since the
early 1980s, Germany and Italy since the late 1990s.
The estimates provide evidence that Denmark’s national party competition is still charac-
terized by a single left/right dimension. The trends of Great Britain and Ireland, the two
other accession countries of this period, are non-monotonic but suggest a two-dimensional
configuration almost all of the time since World War II. Interestingly, Greece acceded in
the beginning of the 1980s and shows a trend, which is very similar to the one of the
founding members. As in Portugal, Greece’s national party competition is represented by
a two-dimensional configuration with an inverted U-shape since the late 1980s. Spain, that
jointly acceded with Portugal in the mid-1980s, shares with its neighbor country a strong,
monotone trend until the 2000s and an indicative reversing trend thereafter. Austria and
Sweden, which acceded in 1995, become two-dimensional in the 2000s, while Finland re-
mains left/right one-dimensional. Overall, our results reveal a country-specific variation
among the 15 countries, which held democratic elections since World War II and became
members of the EU since the mid-1990s. Party competition became two-dimensional over
time in most of these countries, but a few countries remain one-dimensional.
In the 10 countries from Eastern Europe we also find variation across countries and
over time. Some of the new member countries, which acceded in the beginning of the
2000s, exhibit a negative trend towards two-dimensionality, while others show a strong
positive trend. Cyprus, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia appear to have
a kind of national party competition that is characterized by two dimensions, at least
recently. Poland also belongs to this group, but the country experiences only a small
negative trend. Estonia, Hungary and Latvia exhibit positive trends towards national
party competition that is only centered around the left/right dimension. As the time
period of their transformation to parliamentary democracies and membership in the EU
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is much shorter, a cautious interpretation of these trends is however warranted. However,
our country-specific evaluation shows that their accession is not responsible for the overall
trend towards two-dimensionality in national party competition in Europe.
Robustness
We conduct several robustness tests to ensure that our results are not too sensitive to
certain modeling assumptions and the data composition. We only briefly summarize the
results here; the interested reader is referred to the supporting information for further
detail. First, motivated by the sensitivity of mixture models to the choice of the mixing
prior (Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter, 2006), we re-run the model with different priors capturing
different a-priori beliefs about the probability of a one-or two-dimensional space and obtain
virtually identical results. Second, in the model above, we estimate the dimensionality
parameter per election. In order to test the implications of our focus on elections, we
re-estimate the model grouping by decade instead of election. The substantive findings
about the shape of the trends presented below, are the same. Third, we exclude the
eastern European countries to check to what extent the inclusion of these new members
to the European Union has an influence on our results. We obtain virtually the same
results for the other countries. Fourth, we re-run the model 15 times, each time excluding
one of the 16 issue-scales. In 14 out of 15 runs, we obtain virtually the same results.
When we exclude the issue scale Protectionism, the result changes to some extent but
these changes do not affect the substantive conclusions.
Understanding the Changing Dimensionality
Our analysis shows variation across countries and over time in the trend towards two-
dimensionality. To provide more evidence on the validity of our findings and to shed
more light into the country-specific trends, we continue to examine our results. We
begin with examining the dimensionality parameter and assess to what extent the trend
corresponds to critical junctures that may have shaped national party competition, such
as EU membership or applications for membership. We further inspect the factor loadings
to identify which conflicts characterize the left/right and European integration dimension.
Finally, we examine the validity of our party positions by implementing three tests: i) we
identify on the basis of our estimates Eurosceptic parties and compare this list to existing
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categorizations of Eurosceptic parties, ii) we cross-validate our party positions with expert
survey data, and iii) we compare the configuration of party positions to the configuration
of voter preferences as measured with the Eurobarometer public opinion data.
The Role of Critical Junctures
To assess the validity of the dimensionality parameter we identify the ‘critical juncture
year’, which we define as the year in which the (average posterior) probability for the
one-dimensional left/right policy space becomes smaller than the probability for the two-
dimensional policy space. This strategy allows us to compare the trends to important
political events that may have contributed to the emergence of the European integration
dimension in national party competition.
For all acceding countries, we expect that the critical juncture year is related to the year
in which a country applied for EU membership because political parties are more likely to
refer to European integration when the EU is responsible for certain policies, in particular
when the voters dislike this aspect of European integration (De Vries, 2007; Van de Wardt,
De Vries and Hobolt, 2014). We accordingly compare the critical juncture year to the
‘EU influence year’, which we define as the year of their application for EU membership.
The reason is that a country usually starts to prepare for European integration with its
application, i.e. by transposing the entire body of existing EU legislation (the acquis com-
munitaire) into domestic law and fulfilling further accession requirements. For example,
the Eastern European candidate countries had to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria before
their accession to the EU (Nugent, 2004). This may create conflicts about those activities
in the domestic arena, which political parties translate into national party competition.
Excluding Denmark and Finland because they remain one-dimensional left/right, figure
5 plots each accession’s countries’ critical juncture year against the EU influence year.
We also include the founding members in gray. Countries on the gray 45-degree line
turned two-dimensional in the same year as they were influenced by the EU, countries
above turned two-dimensional later and those below earlier. The two fitted regression
lines suggest that there is a strong positive relationship between the critical juncture year
and the EU influence year10. The relationship is weaker when we pool Western and the
10The displayed fitted regression lines are from a linear regression of the EU influence year on the
critical juncture year, identified based on the posterior mean estimates from the dimensionality parameter.
Intercept: -454.12, Slope: 1.23 (Western and Eastern accession countries); Intercept: -1929.24, Slope:
1.98 (Western accession countries). When we propagate the uncertainty from the posterior draws into
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Figure 5: Application for EU membership and critical juncture year. The fitted regression
lines (solid black lines) are fitted using the Western and/or Eastern accession member states
only. The dashed gray line shows the 45-degree line.
10 Eastern European accession countries.
The decreasing slope of the fitted linear regression line suggests that the application for
membership led to a much quicker critical juncture year in the Eastern than Western coun-
tries. This is very plausible because the Eastern countries had make more adjustments
to implement the existing body of EU legislation than countries at previous enlargement
rounds. For example, Austria and Sweden were already members of the European Eco-
nomic Area at the time they joined the EU and, hence, many issues were resolved at
previous negotiation rounds (Nugent, 2004).
th ese estimates, we obtain a density of linear regression coefficients that we summarize using the mean
and the 95% quantile (in brackets). Intercept: -283.4 [-557.1, 97.14], Slope: 1.14 [0.95, 1.28] (Western
and Eastern accession countries); Intercept: 854.90 [-254.78, 1723.53], Slope: 0.56 [0.12, 1.13] (Western
accession countries). The probability that both slope coefficients are positive is 1.
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The evidence suggests that the emergence of the European integration dimension is related
to the increasing influence of the EU for the accession countries. Because European
integration started very slowly in the first decades, the founding members are ‘natural’
outliers in this logic. France is the only country, in which national party competition
was two-dimensional early on. This is consistent with the general finding in the literature
that, except for France, the founding members were characterized by a broad consensus on
European integration in the early years (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008). The BeNeLux
countries turned at the beginnings of the eighties into two-dimensionality, followed by
Germany and Italy around 2000. This suggests that national party competition in the
BeNeLux countries becomes two-dimensional in the period when the Single European Act
was signed, while the timing in Germany and Italy corresponds to the signature of the
Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties.
Conflict over European Integration
Although we find evidence for the relationship between the year of EU influence and the
emergence of the second dimension, we further examine whether this dimension is directly
related to the EU or any other global development. For this purpose we inspect the factor
loadings, which express the relation between an issue scale and the latent party positions
on both dimensions: The larger the factor loading, the more a latent party position is
correlated with an issue scale. Table 1 summarizes the posterior density of the factor
loadings. The issue scales military, enterprise, market and traditional morality are more
strongly related to the left/right-dimension than to the European integration dimension.
Larger values on these scales measure primarily to what extent a party favors a stronger
military, less regulation for enterprises, more entrepreneurial incentives and obedience of
traditional moral values. Substantively, this is in line with the conventional content of
the left/right concept.
While two issues (national way of life and freedom) load almost equally on both dimen-
sions, the remaining issues are stronger associated with the European integration than
the left/right-dimension. Four of these issue scales are at least three times more strongly
associated with the European integration dimension than with the left/right-dimension:
the EU, internationalism, target groups, and multiculturalism. Larger values on these
scales indicate that a party favors a strengthening of EU institutions and enlargement,
an increase in international cooperation, more support for the middle class (as opposed
to minority groups such as immigrants) and denounces cultural diversity and plurality.
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The large positive factor loading on the EU and internationalism suggest that the second
dimension is indeed capturing the conflict over increasing European integration. The
negative loadings on the issue scales target groups and multiculturalism indicate that this
conflict goes beyond a mere conflict over strengthening of EU institutions and enlargement
by also capturing a conflict over the proper regulation and integration of immigrants and
cultural diversity.
LR Dimension EU Dimension
Indicator Post. mean λ BCI Post. mean λ BCI
Military 0.49 [0.45, 0.52] 0.32 [0.24, 0.40]
Freedom 0.28 [0.24, 0.31] 0.28 [0.20, 0.37]
Administration 0.18 [0.14, 0.22] 0.54 [0.45, 0.63]
Enterprise 0.58 [0.54, 0.62] 0.33 [0.23, 0.44]
Market 0.27 [0.23, 0.30] 0.01 [-0.06, 0.08]
Protectionism -0.00 [-0.00, 0.00] 0.11 [0.04, 0.19]
Macroeconomics 0.19 [0.15, 0.23] 0.65 [0.57, 0.73]
Quality of life 0.14 [0.10, 0.18] -0.28 [-0.38, -0.19]
Welfare state 0.29 [0.25, 0.33] -0.49 [-0.57, -0.41]
Traditional morality 0.36 [0.32, 0.39] 0.18 [0.09, 0.27]
Multiculturalism 0.10 [0.07, 0.13] -0.43 [-0.51, -0.36]
Labor groups 0.30 [0.26, 0.34] -0.44 [-0.51, -0.36]
Target groups 0.07 [0.03, 0.10] -0.39 [-0.47, -0.31]
Internationalism -0.10 [-0.14, -0.06] 0.91 [0.82, 0.99]
European Union 0.16 [0.12, 0.20] 0.96 [0.87, 1.05]
National way of life -0.23 [-0.26, -0.19] -0.21 [-0.31, -0.13]
Table 1: Posterior density summary of factor loadings, λ, with posterior mean and 95%
Bayesian credible interval (BCI).
In sum, the inspection of the factor loadings evidences that our estimated dimensions
correspond to the left/right and the European integration dimension. However, the Eu-
ropean integration dimension does not only capture a strengthening of EU institutions,
but also comprises other factors related to immigration and cultural diversity.
Comparing Party Positions
The standard procedure in assessing estimated party positions is cross-validation with
other measures of party positions. In addition to this cross-validation, we also check our
identification of Eurosceptic parties and compare our estimates to public opinion data.
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Figure 6 summarizes the estimated party positions. The graph includes locally-weighted
polynomial regression lines to describe the shape of the party configurations, which can
be driven by parties on the left, right or both sides of the spectrum. Again, the panel is
empty for Denmark and Finland, where we did not identify a second European integration
dimension in national party competition11.
We compare our estimated party positions to Chapel Hill expert survey data12. The cor-
relation between our estimated party positions and the expert scores on the left/right
dimension is high (r = 0.84). The correlation between the expert scores and our esti-
mated party positions for the European integration dimension is lower (r = 0.61). This
confirms the finding of Proksch and Lo (2012) highlighting that the correlation among
different measures of party positions towards European integration is relatively small13.
In our view, there are two reasons for the lower correlation between expert scores and
our estimates for European integration dimension. First, it might indicate a gap between
party leaders’ preferences and the wider party members (see also May, 1973; Norris, 1995;
Kennedy, Lyons and Fitzgerald, 2006). Note that expert surveys ask participants to spec-
ify the positions of the party leaders, while party manifestos capture the officially declared
party positions. Another reason could be that experts perceive European integration only
as a conflict over the transfer of policy competences from the national to the EU level,
while our results on the European integration dimension include issues like target groups
and multiculturalism.
A crucial component for the emergence of a new, cross-cutting European integration
dimension is the existence of Eurosceptic parties, which are located at the left- and right-
wing spectrum. To identify Eurosceptic parties, we follow the procedure of De Vries and
Edwards (2009) and classify each election party that is at least one standard deviation
below the average position on the European integration dimensionas as ‘Eurosceptic’.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of estimated party positions across elections that are
classified by our model to be two-dimensional. Accordingly, all points below the dotted
line represent Eurosceptic parties in our two-dimensional policy spaces (see in more detail
11This does not mean that all Danish and Finnish parties agree on the question of European integration.
It only means that the conflict over European integration does not cross-cut the left/right-dimension.
12When we merge CHES and our estimated party positions based on election year and party ID we
find 76 observations for comparison. To increase the number of observations to 156, we accept a one year
difference between the CHES survey in 1999, 2002 and 2006 with an observation in our dataset. We only
use observations from elections in our dataset that are estimated to be two-dimensional.
13A closer inspection reveals that our lower correlation on the European integration dimension is to
some extend driven by data for two countries: Italy and Belgium. Excluding these two countries increases
the correlation to r = 0.70. The per-country correlations are in the supporting materials.
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Figure 6: Mean posterior party position from all elections that have been classified as two-
dimensional. Superimposed fitted local polynomial regressions indicating the shape of the
party configuration.
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our election-specific list of the 106 Eurosceptic parties in the supporting materials). In
his study of Euroscepticism Taggart (1998) lists 37 Eurosceptic parties, from which 26
are also included in the CMP dataset14. When we leave out Finland and Denmark, the
two countries for which we did not identify a European integration dimension, our model
classifies 77% of Taggart’s parties as Eurosceptic. The posterior probability that parties
classified by Taggart as Eurosceptic take a more Eurosceptic position than the rest is 1.
Finally, we compare our estimated party positions to survey data from the Eurobarom-
eter surveys. As many Eurobarometer respondents do not indicate a party preference,
we decided to compare directly the configuration of the estimated party positions with
respondents’ preferences for European integration of left/right. We expect that the con-
figuration of party positions should correspond to the respondents’ preferences if our
estimates are valid. To classify the shapes in figure 6 we use the posterior probability.
More specifically, we examine whether the posterior probability that the left side of the
fitted curve is below the right side is larger than 90%. Then, we compare this classifica-
tion to the structure of public preferences, which we measure with Eurobarometer data
following the approach of Carrubba (2001)15.
Table 2 summarizes the results. In 9 out of 13 countries the structure of the Eurobarom-
eter preferences reflects the pattern of party positions. There are four deviating cases:
Ireland, Sweden, Spain and Germany. In Spain and Germany the Eurobarometer data
indicates a stronger concentration of Eurosceptics on the right than we find in the mani-
festo data of political parties. One reason could be that the radical right party spectrum
was marginalized and fragmented after the breakdown of the Franco regime in Spain and
the Nazi regime in Germany (e.g. Go´mez-Reino, Llamazares and Ramiro, 2008, p. 145).
The largely irrelevant right-wing peripheral parties are thus not considered by the CMP
project, which may explain the divergence between Eurobarometer and manifesto data in
the two countries. In Ireland and Sweden, the respondents on the left are more Euroscep-
14Two reasons explain this discrepancy. First, the CMP project only considers relevant parties, which
usually corresponds to parties with seats in their respective national parliaments. Second, Taggart (1998)
lists some single-issue parties that competed at European parliamentary elections, which the CMP project
does not consider.
15We use the responded left/right placement on a 10-point scale and their response to the question
“Generally speaking, do you think that (country’s) membership in the European Community / Common
Market / European Union is a good thing / neither nor / bad thing”. For all respondents that placed
themselves at the extreme left (1-2) and the extreme right (9-10), we calculate the difference between the
percentage that responded the EU was “a good thing” and the percentage that said it is bad. We also
calculate nonparametric bootstrap confidence intervals to account for sampling uncertainty. Finally, we
pool Eurobarometer surveys between the country’s critical juncture and its last election in our dataset
(Schmitt et al., 2008) to estimate distribution of voter preferences for each election.
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tic than the party manifestos indicate. Note that the analysis of Sweden is only based
on two elections, which makes inferen ces on the basis of a locally-weighted polynomial
regression more difficult. One potential reason for the divergence in the case of Ireland
is that the Eurobarometer surveys do not cover the 1950s and 1960s where the manifesto
data indicate a strong right-wing Euroscepticism (e.g. Fianna Fa´il).
Voters
Parties Left Balanced Right
Left GRC, PRT ESP
Balanced IRL AUT, BEL DEU
SWE LUX, NLD
Right FRA,GBR
ITA
Table 2: Cross Tabulation: Eurosceptic voters and Eurosceptic parties
In summary, we implemented three tests. First, we compared our latent party posi-
tions to expert survey data. Although our estimated positions correlate relatively high
on the left/right dimension, we presented our broader conception of the European inte-
gration dimension as a reason for the slightly lower correlation between our and other
estimates for this dimension. Second, we identified parties as Eurosceptic and compared
this classification to previous lists of Eurosceptic parties. This test reveals a very high
correspondence between our identification of Eurosceptic parties and the party lists of the
literature on Euroscepticism. Finally, we compared the shape of the graphs to graphs of
the Eurobarometer public opinion survey, which shows for most countries a reflection of
the structure of the Eurobarometer voter preferences with the configuration of our party
positions.
Concluding Remarks
This article investigates whether, when and where a new, cross-cutting European integra-
tion dimension emerges in national party competition of 25 EU member countries in the
period since World War II. We develop a Bayesian Mixture Factor Analysis that allows
us to estimate the probability of a one-dimensional left/right versus a two-dimensional
inverted U-shaped configuration at each election. For our empirical analysis we transform
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programmatic manifesto data and combine these data with expert evaluations of party
family positions to estimate the election-specific dimensionality of national party compe-
tition (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann and Volkens, 2007; Lowe et al., 2011; Steenbergen
and Marks, 2007; Hooghe et al., 2010). Our findings reveal that the European integration
dimension becomes increasingly important over time in national party competition for
almost all countries. This general trend towards a second dimension is especially strong
since the 1990s in almost all countries. Only in Denmark and Finland do we not find a
two-dimensional space with an inverted U-shape.
Our substantive inspection of the European integration dimension suggests that this trend
towards a second dimension is related to important political events, such as applications
for EU membership. With the application for EU membership, the EU is becoming an
important element of national party competition because the country needs to implement
the existing body of EU legislation. Our results indicate that the European integration di-
mension reflects the preferences over the transfer of policy competences from the national
to the EU level, which also includes issues on immigration and cultural diversity. Since
our estimated party positions are in line with expert surveys, existing lists of Eurosceptic
parties and public opinion data, we are confident about the validity of this finding.
Our analysis also highlights that the dimensionality of policy spaces may change consid-
erably over time and countries. This indicates that a closer inspection is warranted for
answering questions on when and where this second dimension emerges. Although we find
a general trend towards two-dimensionality, we also identify exemptions and possible re-
versions of this trend. This means that the influence of European integration for national
party competition is neither deterministic nor irreversible. The number of Eurosceptic
parties is growing in most countries, which profit from the declining public support for
European integration. This is documented in expert surveys, which report about an in-
verted U-shaped configuration of party positions in national party competition (Marks,
Wilson and Ray, 2002; Benoit and Laver, 2006). However, our findings reveal that this
configuration increasingly exists in the manifestos of the political parties.
The trend towards two-dimensionality may have consequences for our understanding and
analysis of a variety of political phenomena, such as coalition formation in countries, where
coalition governance is the rule rather than an exception (e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks,
1988; Laver and Shepsle, 1990; Baron, 1991; Martin and Stevenson, 2001; Strøm, Mu¨ller
and Bergman, 2008). For example, Krehbiel (1988, p. 267) argues that “simply expanding
the dimensionality of the policy space from one to two has profoundly disequilibrating
26
consequences”. We expect that an emerging European integration dimension will increase
the likelihood for grand coalitions consisting of central parties. This may however further
increase the popularity of peripheral parties which may form coalitions as well, especially
when public support for European integration is further decreasing in a member country
as our introductory Greek example suggests. Future research may advance our theoretical
knowledge by studying these dynamics and circumstances under which the dimensionality
of party competition changes (see for an exception Carmines and Stimson, 1981).
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